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R&D-based growth model and 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of 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respond by importing more inputs, which have technology spillovers and enhance their
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1 Introduction
This study explores the e¤ects of minimum wage on innovation. The novelty of our analysis
is that we consider the heterogeneous e¤ects of minimum wage on di¤erent types of rms.
First, we use rm-level data in China to document some empirical patterns. Then, we develop
an open-economy R&D-based growth model in which some rms import inputs from abroad
whereas other rms use domestic inputs. We apply this growth-theoretic framework to
explore the di¤erent e¤ects of minimum wage on the innovation of the two types of rms.
Within our growth-theoretic framework, a higher minimum wage reduces innovation of
rms that use domestic inputs but increases innovation of rms that import foreign inputs.
Intuitively, when a higher minimum wage reduces employment, importing rms respond by
importing a larger amount of inputs. Following empirical evidence in the literature,1 we
assume that imported inputs give rise to technology spillovers from abroad. As a result, the
increase in imported inputs enhances research e¢ciency of importing rms and leads to a
reallocation of research labor from non-importing rms to importing rms. Consequently,
innovation of non-importing rms decreases, whereas innovation of importing rms increases.
As for the empirics, we consider rm-level data in China and obtain the following results.
First, a higher minimum wage is associated with a larger amount of imported inputs. Fur-
thermore, a higher minimum wage is associated with a lower level of innovation (measured
by patents) by non-importing rms but a higher level of innovation by importing rms. All
these empirical results are consistent with our theory.
This study relates to the theoretical literature on innovation and economic growth. Sem-
inal studies by Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a)
and Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the R&D-based growth model. While all these early
studies feature full employment, some subsequent studies use di¤erent approaches to incor-
porate equilibrium unemployment into the R&D-based growth model.2 A branch of this
literature uses variants of the R&D-based growth model to explore the e¤ects of minimum
wage on unemployment and innovation; see Askenazy (2003), Meckl (2004), Agenor and Lim
(2018), Chu, Kou and Wang (2019) and Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa and Liao (2019). This study
contributes to this literature by showing that minimum wage has heterogeneous e¤ects on
innovation of di¤erent rms and by testing these heterogeneous e¤ects using rm-level data.
This study also relates to the empirical literature on the determinants of innovation and
productivity. Amiti and Konings (2007), Goldberg et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2017) and
Mo et al. (2019) use rm-level data to show that imported inputs enhance innovation and
productivity.3 Mayneris et al. (2018) and Hau et al. (2019) use rm-level data in China to
show that minimum wage improves the productivity of rms.4 Our study complements these
interesting studies by examining the e¤ects of minimum wage on rm-level innovation and
by showing that minimum wage a¤ects non-importing rms and importing rms di¤erently
via imported inputs and their spillover e¤ects on technologies.5
1See Amiti and Konings (2007), Goldberg et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2017) and Mo et al. (2019).
2See for example Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) for search frictions, Parello (2010) for e¢ciency wage,
Peretto (2011) for wage bargaining, and Ji et al. (2016) and Chu et al. (2016, 2018) for trade unions.
3Lu and Ng (2012) also use rm-level data to show that imports spur incremental innovation in China.
4Fan et al. (2018) use rm-level data in China to examine the e¤ects of minimum wage on FDI.
5Liu et al. (2015) and Liu and Qiu (2016) nd that trade liberalization and tari¤ reduction also have
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The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 documents empirical evidence.
Section 3 describes the theoretical model. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Evidence
In this section, we rst specify our regressions and describe the data that we use. Then, we
present some regression results.
2.1 Empirical specication
We explore the e¤ects of minimum wage on rms imported inputs and innovation using
manufacturing rm-level data in China from 2001 to 2013. Specically, we estimate the
e¤ects of minimum wage using the following two regression models.
Our rst regression model is specied as
imp_valueit = 0 + 1min_wagec;t 1 + 1Xi;t 1 + 2Zc;t 1 + 'i + 't + it,
where imp_valueit is the log value of imported capital goods by rm i in year t.
6 min_wagec;t 1
is the log value of monthly minimum wage in city c in year t  1. Xi;t 1 is a vector of rm-
level control variables, whereas Zc;t 1 is a vector of city-level control variables. 'i denotes
rm xed e¤ects, whereas 't denotes year xed e¤ects. The standard errors it are clustered
at city level. 1 captures the e¤ects of minimum wage on rms imported inputs.
Our second regression model is specied as
patentit = 0 + 1min_wagec;t 1 + 2min_wagec;t 1  importi;t 1 + 3importi;t 1
+1Xi;t 1 + 2Zc;t 1 + 'i + 't + it,
where patentit is the log value of the number of patent applications by rm i in year t.
7 If
rm i imports capital goods in year t 1, then importi;t 1 is equal to 1; otherwise, importi;t 1
is equal to 0.8 The interaction term min_wagec;t 1  importi;t 1 captures the additional
e¤ect of minimum wage on importing rms. Other variables are the same as before. Here 1
captures the e¤ects of minimum wage on non-importing rms innovation. 1 + 2 captures
the e¤ects of minimum wage on importing rms innovation.
Firm-level control variables Xi;t 1 include rm size measured by total assets, the capital-
labor ratio, the proportion of the rms exports in total sales, and rm age. City-level control
variables Zc;t 1 include GDP per capita and the population size. All variables are in log,
except for the proportion of the rms exports in total sales. Appendix A provides their
summary statistics and data sources.
multiple e¤ects on innovation.
6Given that some rms do not import, we add one to the value of imported capital goods. Capital goods
are those with BEC classication code of 41 and 521 provided by United Nations, see BEC classication in
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/classications/correspondence-tables.asp.
7Given that some rms have zero patent applications, we add one to the number of patent applications.
8We will consider an alternative denition of importing rms in the robustness checks.
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2.2 Regression results
This section reports regression results on the e¤ects of minimum wage on rms imported
inputs and innovation. Table 1 presents the estimation results of the rst regression, in which
we consider imported capital goods.9 As shown in Table 1, the coe¢cients of minimum wage
are positive and signicant at 1% signicance level across all three columns. Therefore, a
higher minimum wage is associated with a positive e¤ect on imported capital goods.
Table 1: Minimum wage on imported inputs
imported capital goods
(1) (2) (3)
min_wage 0.238*** 0.199*** 0.203***
(0.054) (0.048) (0.050)
Firm-level controls No Yes Yes
City-level controls No No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2236711 2236711 2236711
Adj R-Squared 0.713 0.714 0.714
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard
errors clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses. All
dependent variables are logarithmic after adding 1. Firm-level
controls include log rm size, log capital-labor ratio, the propor-
tion of rm exports in total sales and log rm age. City-level
controls include log per capita city GDP and log city population.
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the second regression. Column (1), (3) and (5)
show that minimum wage is negatively and signicantly associated with patent applications.
If we do not separate between importing rms and non-importing rms, we would conclude
that raising the minimum wage negatively a¤ects the innovation of all rms. However, in
column (2), (4) and (6), we see that although minimum wage is negatively and signicantly
associated with non-importing rms patent applications, it is positively and signicantly
associated with importing rms patent applications; e.g., 1 + 2 = 0:140 in column (6).
Therefore, raising the minimum wage has heterogeneous e¤ects on the innovation of import-
ing and non-importing rms.
Patents are classied into three categories: invention, utility model, and design. We
now examine the separate e¤ects of minimum wage on these three types of patent appli-
cations. Table 3 shows that minimum wage is negatively and signicantly associated with
all of non-importing rms patent applications but positively and signicantly associated
with importing rms applications for invention patents and utility patents, which capture
innovation better than design patents.10
9Cavallo and Landry (2010) nd that imported capital goods have a signicant positive e¤ect on economic
growth in the US, whereas Mo et al. (2019) nd that imported capital goods have a signicant positive e¤ect
on Chinese rms productivity and R&D investment.
10Liu et al. (2015) nd that trade liberalization also has di¤erent e¤ects on di¤erent types of patents.
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Table 2: Minimum wage on patent applications
all patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
min_wage -0.087*** -0.084*** -0.101*** -0.098*** -0.103*** -0.100***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
min_wage  import 0.232*** 0.241*** 0.240***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
import -1.418*** -1.490*** -1.486***
(0.133) (0.127) (0.127)
Firm-level Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-level Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 
1
+ 
2
> 0 34.750 33.989 32.917
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711
Adj R-Squared 0.442 0.445 0.446 0.449 0.446 0.449
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level
are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic after adding 1. Firm-level
controls include log rm size, log capital-labor ratio, the proportion of rm exports in total sales
and log rm age. City-level controls include log per capita city GDP and log city population. The
F-test of column (2), (4) and (6) test the sum of the estimated coe¢cients on min_wage and
min_wage  import.
Table 3: Minimum wage on di¤erent categories of patent applications
invention utility design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
min_wage -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.032*** -0.032***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
min_wage  import 0.162*** 0.206*** 0.025**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.010)
import -1.008*** -1.283*** -0.145**
(0.073) (0.089) (0.062)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 
1
+ 
2
> 0 63.208 53.612 0.595
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.441
Observations 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711
Adj R-Squared 0.427 0.431 0.408 0.411 0.329 0.329
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level
are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic after adding 1. Firm-level
controls include log rm size, log capital-labor ratio, the proportion of rm exports in total sales
and log rm age. City-level controls include log per capita city GDP and log city population. The
F-test of column (2), (4) and (6) test the sum of the estimated coe¢cients on min_wage and
min_wage  import.
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In summary, we have identied the following patterns in the data. First, minimum wage
is associated with a positive e¤ect on imported capital goods. Second, minimum wage is
associated with a negative e¤ect on non-importing rms innovation. Third, minimum wage
is associated with a positive e¤ect on importing rms innovation. In Appendix B, we perform
a number of robustness checks and nd that these results are robust to a di¤erent measure
of innovation, an alternative denition of importing rms and controlling industry-year xed
e¤ects that capture time-varying industry characteristics. We also address endogeneity by
using the approach developed by Dube et al. (2010) and adapted to China by Fan et al.
(2018) to consider city pairs located near borders of di¤erent provinces in order to exploit
policy discontinuities at provincial borders.
3 An open-economy R&D-based growth model
In this section, we develop an innovation-driven growth model to interpret the empirical
patterns documented in the previous section. The open-economy R&D-based growth model
is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991b). We follow Chu et al. (2018) to extend the
Grossman-Helpman model into multiple sectors. Specically, rms in one sector use domestic
inputs for the production of di¤erentiated products, whereas rms in the other sector use
foreign inputs for the production of di¤erentiated products. Furthermore, we generalize the
model in Chu et al. (2018) by introducing minimum wage and allowing for a non-unitary
elasticity of substitution between labor and imported inputs in production. For simplicity,
we assume that the terms of trade is exogenous as in Grossman and Helpman (1991b).
3.1 Household
There is a representative household in the economy. The utility function of the household is
U =
Z
1
0
e t(lnCy;t +  lnCz;t)dt. (1)
The parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Cy;t is the consumption of a domestic
nal good, which is chosen as the numeraire.11 The parameter   0 determines the impor-
tance of the consumption of a foreign nal good Cz;t imported from abroad.
12 pz is the price
of this foreign good and also the terms of trade, which is exogenous for simplicity.
The household maximizes utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:
_at = rtat + wh;t + wl;t(L
d
t + L
f
t ) + bt(l   L
d
t   L
f
t )   t   Cy;t   pzCz;t. (2)
at is the amount of assets, and rt is the interest rate.
13 The household supplies one unit
of high-skill research labor to earn the high-skill wage rate wh;t, which is higher than the
11Domestic nal good can be consumed by the household, used to produce intermediate inputs or exported.
12Imported foreign nal good can be consumed by the household or used to produce intermediate inputs.
13Here we assume nancial autarky under which the domestic nancial market is not integrated to the
global nancial market. This assumption is reasonable given capital control in China. Under the assumption
of nancial autarky, it can be shown that the asset-accumulation equation ensures balanced trade.
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minimum wage. The household also supplies l units of low-skill production labor, among
which Ldt + L
f
t units of low-skill labor work in the two production sectors fd; fg and earn
the minimum wage wl;t. The unemployed low-skill labor l L
d
t  L
f
t receives unemployment
benet bt < wl;t.  t is a lump-sum tax collected by the government. Standard dynamic
optimization yields the following optimality conditions:
_Cy;t
Cy;t
= rt   , (3)
Cz;t = Cy;t=pz. (4)
3.2 Domestic nal good
Competitive rms produce domestic nal good Yt. The production function is given by
Yt = (X
d
t )
0:5(Xft )
0:5. (5)
Xdt denotes the intermediate good that uses domestic inputs, whereas X
f
t denotes the inter-
mediate good that uses foreign inputs. From prot maximization, we derive the conditional
demand functions for Xdt and X
f
t as
Xdt =
Yt
2P dt
, (6)
Xft =
Yt
2P ft
. (7)
P dt denotes the price of X
d
t , whereas P
f
t denotes the price of X
f
t .
3.3 Intermediate goods
Competitive rms produce intermediate good i 2 fd; fg. The production function for Xdt is
Xdt = (L
d
t )
1 
Z ndt
0
[xdt (!)]
d!, (8a)
where Ldt denotes domestic production labor and x
d
t (!) denotes domestic capital goods ! 2
[0; ndt ] for the production of X
d
t . The production function for X
f
t is
Xft =
8<
:(1  )(Lft ) " 1" + 
"Z nft
0
[xft (!)]
d!
# " 1
"
9=
;
"
" 1
, (8b)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic production labor Lft and
foreign capital goods xft (!) for ! 2 [0; n
f
t ].
14 This non-unitary elasticity of substitution
14It is useful to note thatXft is produced by combining domestic labor L
f
t and foreign input x
f
t (!) imported
from abroad. So, Xft is not a foreign good but a domestically produced good that uses some foreign inputs.
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between labor and imported capital goods will interact with the technology spillovers of
imported capital goods to a¤ect innovation.15 From prot maximization, we derive the
conditional demand functions for Lit and x
i
t(!) as
wl;t = (1  )
P dt X
d
t
Ldt
= (1  ft )
P ft X
f
t
Lft
, (9)
pdt (!) = 
P dt X
d
tR ndt
0
[xdt (!)]
d!
[xdt (!)]
 1, (10a)
pft (!) = 
f
t
P ft X
f
tR nft
0
[xft (!)]
d!
[xft (!)]
 1, (10b)
where
ft 

hR nft
0
[xft (!)]
d!
i " 1
"
(1  )(Lft )
" 1
" + 
hR nft
0
[xft (!)]
d!
i " 1
"
and pit(!) is the price of x
i
t(!) for i 2 fd; fg.
3.4 Domestic capital goods
A monopolistic rm uses xdt (!) units of domestic nal good to produce x
d
t (!) units of do-
mestic capital good ! 2 [0; ndt ].
16 Therefore, the prot function for producing xdt (!) units of
domestic capital good ! is
dt (!) = p
d
t (!)x
d
t (!)  x
d
t (!) = 
P dt X
d
tR ndt
0
[xdt (!)]
d!
[xdt (!)]
   xdt (!). (11)
The monopolistic price is pdt (!) = 1=, and the amount of prot for ! 2 [0; n
d
t ] is
dt (!) =
1  

xdt (!) = (1  )
P dt X
d
t
ndt
= (1  )
Yt
2ndt
 dt , (12)
where the second equality uses symmetry in (10a) and pdt (!) = 1=. Later on, we will show
that the economy features a steady state (instead of a balanced growth path) due to the
obsolescence of products.17 The steady-state value of an invention is
vdt (!) =
dt (!)
r + 
= (1  )
Yt
2ndt
1
+ 
 vdt , (13)
where the parameter  > 0 is the probability that a product becomes obsolete.
15Given the lack of evidence, we do not assume technology spillovers from domestic capital goods; therefore,
we focus in the main text on a unitary elasticity of substitution between labor and domestic capital goods
in the production of Xdt for simplicity; see Appendix C for the case of a CES production function for X
d
t .
16A rm may own the patents for producing multiple varieties of domestic capital goods.
17See also Grossman and Lai (2004).
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3.5 Foreign capital goods
A monopolistic rm imports xft (!) units of foreign nal good to produce x
f
t (!) units of
foreign capital good ! 2 [0; nft ].
18 Therefore, the prot function for producing xft (!) units
of foreign capital good ! is
ft (!) = p
f
t (!)x
f
t (!)  pzx
f
t (!) = 
f
t
P ft X
f
tR nft
0
[xft (!)]
d!
[xft (!)]
   pzx
f
t (!). (14)
The monopolistic price is pft (!) = pz=, and the amount of prot for ! 2 [0; n
f
t ] is
ft (!) =
1  

pzx
f
t (!) = (1  ) 
f
t
P ft X
f
t
nft
= (1  ) ft
Yt
2nft
 ft , (15)
where the second equality uses symmetry in (10b) and pft (!) = pz=. The steady-state value
of an invention is
vft (!) =
ft (!)
r + 
= (1  ) ft
Yt
2nft
1
+ 
 vft , (16)
where  > 0 is once again the probability that a product becomes obsolete.
3.6 R&D for non-importing rms
We refer to rms in the sector that uses only domestic capital goods as non-importing rms.
Firms in this sector d devote one unit of domestic high-skill research labor to invent a new
variety of di¤erentiated products. The zero-prot condition of R&D in sector d is given by
vdt = w
h
t . (17)
Together with the obsolescence  of existing products, the law of motion for ndt is given by
_ndt = R
d
t   n
d
t , (18)
where Rdt denotes domestic R&D labor in sector d. Therefore, the steady-state level of n
d
t is
given by nd = Rd=, which is increasing in R&D labor in the sector.
3.7 R&D for importing rms
We refer to rms in the sector that uses foreign capital goods as importing rms. Firms in
this sector f devote 1=(1 + It) units of domestic high-skill research labor to invent a new
variety of di¤erentiated products. The zero-prot condition of R&D in sector f is given by
vft = w
h
t =(1 + It). Together with the obsolescence  of existing products, the law of motion
for nft is given by
_nft = (1 + It)R
f
t   n
f
t , (19)
18An importing rm may own the patents for producing multiple varieties of foreign capital goods.
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where Rft denotes domestic R&D labor in sector f . Therefore, the steady-state level of n
f
t
is given by nf = (1 + I)Rf=, where  > 0 is an import-spillover parameter. We assume
that the productivity of Rft depends on the intensity It of imported inputs. Specically,
It  pz;t
Z nft
0
xft (!)d!=Yt
is the value of imported inputs as a ratio of output. We adapt this specication from Gross-
man and Helpman (1991b), who also assume that knowledge spillovers arise from trade.19
Imposing symmetry and using (7) and (15), one can show that It = 
f
t =2. If we dene
  =2, then the zero-prot condition of R&D in sector f can be re-expressed as
(1 + ft )v
f
t = w
h
t , (20)
where ft = It captures the spillover e¤ects of imported inputs.
3.8 Government
The government sets a minimum wage that is binding in the production sectors. The total
supply of low-skill production labor is l, and unemployment is l Ldt  L
f
t . The government
sets the minimum wage as
wl;t = . (21)
Combining (6), (7), (9) and (21) yields the level of low-skill employment in sector i 2 fh; fg:
Ldt = (1  )
Yt
2
, (22a)
Lft = (1  
f
t )
Yt
2
. (22b)
For a su¢ciently large , the minimum wage is binding such that Ldt + L
f
t < l. Finally, the
government levies a lump-sum tax  t on the household to pay for the unemployment benet
bt subject to
 t = bt(l   L
d
t   L
f
t ). (23)
3.9 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fCz;t; Cy;t; Yt; X
d
t ; X
f
t ; x
d
t (!); x
f
t (!); L
d
t ; L
f
t ; R
d
t ; R
f
t g
1
t=0
and prices fpz; rt; w
h
t ; w
l
t; P
d
t ; P
f
t ; p
d
t (!); p
f
t (!); v
d
t ; v
f
t g
1
t=0. Also, at each instance of time,
 the representative household chooses fCz;t; Cy;tg to maximize lifetime utility taking
fpz; rt; w
h
t ; w
l
tg as given;
19See Coe and Helpman (1995) for empirical evidence that trade stimulates international spillovers and
also Chen et al. (2017) and Mo et al. (2019) for evidence that imported inputs stimulate innovation.
10
 competitive rms produce Yt to maximize prot taking fP
d
t ; P
f
t g as given;
 competitive rms produce Xdt to maximize prot taking fw
l
t; P
d
t ; p
d
t (!)g as given;
 competitive rms produce Xft to maximize prot taking fw
l
t; P
f
t ; p
f
t (!)g as given;
 a monopolistic rm produces xdt (!) and sets p
d
t (!) to maximize prot;
 a monopolistic rm produces xft (!) and sets p
f
t (!) to maximize prot taking pz as
given;
 R&D labor Rdt performs innovation to maximize prot taking fw
h
t ; v
d
t g as given;
 R&D labor Rft performs innovation to maximize prot taking fw
h
t ; v
f
t g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for high-skill labor holds such that Rdt +R
f
t = 1;
 the minimum wage in the low-skill labor market implies Ldt + L
f
t < l;
 the trade account is balanced such that Yt Cy;t 
R ndt
0
xdt (!)d! = pzCz;t+pz
R nft
0
xft (!)d!.
4 E¤ects of minimum wage on import and innovation
We now examine the steady-state e¤ects of minimum wage. From (22a), production labor
Ldt in sector d is decreasing in the minimum-wage parameter  for a given Yt. From (22b),
production labor Lft in sector f is also decreasing in  for a given 
f and Yt. Intuitively,
an increase in the minimum wage reduces labor demand and the employment level. From
(10b), the income share f of imported capital goods in sector f is given by
f =


(nf )1=xf
(" 1)="
(1  )(Lf )(" 1)=" +  [(nf )1=xf ]
(" 1)="
, (24)
which is decreasing in Lf for a given (nf )1=xf . In other words, for a given (nf )1=xf , a
higher minimum wage  leads to an increase in the income share f of imported capital
goods by decreasing Lf due to the substitutability between labor and imported inputs.
Combining (13), (16), (17) and (20) yields the steady-state ratio of relative technology
between the two sectors as
nf
nd
=
(1 + f )f

, (25)
which is increasing in f due to the technology spillovers f of imported capital goods in
sector f . Substituting nf = (1 + f )Rf= and nd = Rd= into (25) yields the relative level
of R&D labor between the two sectors as20
Rf
Rd
=
Rf
1 Rf
=
f

, (26)
20If we also assume a CES production function for Xdt in (8a), then we have R
f=Rd = f=d, which is
nonetheless increasing in  if and only if  > 0; see Appendix C for the derivations.
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where the rst equality uses the resource constraint on high-skill labor Rd + Rf = 1. In
the proof of Proposition 1, we show that f is increasing in minimum wage . Therefore,
R&D labor Rf in sector f is increasing in minimum wage , whereas R&D labor Rd in
sector d is decreasing in . Intuitively, when a higher minimum wage reduces employment,
importing rms respond by importing more capital goods, which have technology spillovers
and improve research e¢ciency in sector f . This leads to a reallocation of research labor
from sector d to sector f . As a result, the level of innovation nf = (1 + f )Rf= in sector
f increases, whereas the level of innovation nd = Rd= in sector d decreases.
The above results can be summarized as follows. First, a higher minimum wage causes a
positive e¤ect on imported capital goods. Second, a higher minimum wage causes a negative
e¤ect on non-importing rms innovation. Third, a higher minimum wage causes a positive
e¤ect on importing rms innovation. Proposition 1 summarizes these results, which provide
a theoretical interpretation on the empirical patterns documented in Section 2.
Proposition 1 If the import-spillover parameter and the elasticity of substitution are not
excessively large such that  < 1= and " < 1=(1   ), then the economy features a unique
steady-state equilibrium. In this case, a higher minimum wage causes the following e¤ects:
(1) an increase in the intensity of imported inputs; (2) a decrease in innovation of non-
importing rms; and (3) an increase in innovation of importing rms.
Proof. See Appendix C.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the heterogeneous e¤ects of minimum wage on innovation
of di¤erent types of rms. Using an open-economy R&D-based growth model, we have
shown that a higher minimum wage reduces innovation of rms that use domestic inputs
but increases innovation of rms that import foreign inputs. These heterogeneous e¤ects of
minimum wage on the innovation of the two types of rms are consistent with the empirical
patterns that we have documented using rm-level data in China. Therefore, previous studies
that explore the overall e¤ect of minimum wage on rm-level innovation may have neglected
the heterogeneous responses of di¤erent types of rms.
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Appendix A: Data
We use four databases in China: (1) rm-level nancial statement data, (2) rm-product-
level trade data, (3) rm-level patent application and citation data, and (4) city-level mini-
mum wage and economic data. We merge rst three set rm-level data by rms name. The
sample period is from 2001 to 2013, and we have 2236711 observations of 436751 manufac-
turing rms after data cleaning.
First, rm-level nancial statement data come from the Annual Survey of Industrial
Firms (ASIF) maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC).21 Sec-
ond, rm-product-level trade data come from Chinas General Administration of Customs
(CGAC). Third, rm-level patent application data come from China National Intellectual
Property Administration (CNIPA), and patent citation data come from Google Patent. Fi-
nally, we collect city-level minimum wage from local government websites, and city-level
economic data come from China City Statistical Yearbook (CCSY).
Table A1 and A2 provide the summary statistics and the data sources.
Table A1: Summary statistics of the key variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Observations Mean S.D. Min Max
Dependent Variables
imp_value 2236711 0.624 2.131 0 17.852
all patents 2236711 0.128 0.515 0 8.757
invention 2236711 0.050 0.290 0 8.668
utility 2236711 0.079 0.378 0 7.196
design 2236711 0.034 0.274 0 7.049
citations 2236711 0.065 0.400 0 10.574
citations2 2236711 0.063 0.393 0 10.540
Independent Variables
min_wage 2236711 6.431 0.418 5.075 7.313
import 2236711 0.096 0.294 0 1
import2 2236711 0.149 0.356 0 1
Control Variables
firmsize 2236711 10.089 1.435 3.296 19.295
K=L 2236711 3.846 1.361 -7.424 14.075
exp ratio 2236711 0.169 0.336 0 1
age 2236711 2.045 0.771 0 4.159
GDP per capita 2236711 10.376 0.911 5.958 13.018
population 2236711 6.249 0.603 2.770 8.115
Notes: All dependent variables are logarithmic after adding 1. All independent
variables and control variables are in year t  1.
21ASIF data in 2010 include some misreported information, so we drop it.
15
Table A2: Data sources of the key variables
(1) (2)
Variables Denition Data source
imp_value The log of total amount of imported capital goods CGAC
all patents The log of patent applications CNIPA
invention The log of invention patent applications CNIPA
utility The log of utility-model patent applications CNIPA
design The log of design patent applications CNIPA
citations The log of the number of rms patents cited Google Patent
citations2 The log of the number of rms patents cited (exclude self cited) Google Patent
min_wage The log of monthly minimum wage at city level Local government websites
import A dummy variable of import capital goods CGAC
import2 A dummy variable of import capital goods (alternative denition) CGAC
firmsize The log of total asset ASIF
K=L The log of capital-labor ratio ASIF
exp ratio The proportion of rm exports in total sales ASIF
age The log of rm age ASIF
GDP per capita The log of GDP per capita at city level CCSY
population The log of population at city level CCSY
16
Appendix B: Robustness checks
In this appendix, we perform a number of robustness checks. In Table B1, we consider
patent citations as an alternative measure of innovation. In Table B2, we consider the
following alternative denition of import status: we classify rms that have ever imported
capital goods before time t as importing rms in time t. In Table B3, we add industry-year
xed e¤ects to capture time-varying industry characteristics, such as industrial policies, that
may inuence rms innovation activities. In Table B4, we use the approach in Dube et
al. (2010) to address endogeneity by considering city pairs located near borders of di¤erent
provinces in order to exploit policy discontinuities at provincial borders.22
Table B1: Minimum wage on patent citations
citations citations2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
min_wage -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.037***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
min_wage  import 0.145*** 0.139***
(0.013) (0.013)
import -0.893*** -0.856***
(0.083) (0.080)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 
1
+ 
2
> 0 39.820 39.179
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Observations 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711
Adj R-Squared 0.390 0.392 0.387 0.389
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the city level are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are
logarithmic after adding 1. Citations are the number of rms patents cited,
and citations2 are the number of rms patents cited which exclude self cited.
Firm-level controls include log rm size, log capital-labor ratio, the proportion
of rm exports in total sales and log rm age. City-level controls include log
per capita city GDP and log city population. The F-test of column (2) and
(4) test the sum of the estimated coe¢cients on min_wage and min_wage 
import.
22Finally, we get 2175642 observations from 201 city pairs and 171 unique cities among all 286 cities in
our sample.
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Table B2: Alternative denition of import status
all patents invention utility design citations citations2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
min_wage -0.089*** -0.035*** -0.063*** -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.032***
(0.019) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
min_wage  import2 0.206*** 0.137*** 0.175*** 0.023** 0.115*** 0.109***
(0.021) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
import2 -1.170*** -0.802*** -1.019*** -0.110* -0.652*** -0.620***
(0.129) (0.066) (0.086) (0.065) (0.070) (0.068)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 
1
+ 
2
> 0 27.128 58.824 44.243 0.619 33.480 32.460
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.432 0.000 0.000
Observations 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711
Adj R-Squared 0.451 0.432 0.413 0.329 0.393 0.389
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level
are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic after adding 1. Citations are
the number of rms patents cited, and citations2 are the number of rms patents cited which
exclude self cited. Firm-level controls include log rm size, log capital-labor ratio, the proportion
of rm exports in total sales and log rm age. City-level controls include log per capita city GDP
and log city population. The F-test of each column tests the sum of the estimated coe¢cients on
min_wage and min_wage  import2.
Table B3: Controlling industry-year xed e¤ects
all patents invention utility design citations citations2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
min_wage -0.080*** -0.035*** -0.052*** -0.026*** -0.035*** -0.033***
(0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
min_wage  import 0.175*** 0.130*** 0.147*** 0.018** 0.118*** 0.113***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013)
import -1.073*** -0.804*** -0.910*** -0.101* -0.726*** -0.693***
(0.124) (0.074) (0.086) (0.053) (0.087) (0.084)
Firm-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 
1
+ 
2
> 0 16.366 37.696 30.821 1.006 24.427 23.935
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.317 0.000 0.000
Observations 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711 2236711
Adj R-Squared 0.456 0.437 0.422 0.330 0.395 0.391
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level
are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic after adding 1. Citations are
the number of rms patents cited, and citations2 are the number of rms patents cited which
exclude self cited. Firm-level controls include log rm size, log capital-labor ratio, the proportion
of rm exports in total sales and log rm age. City-level controls include log per capita city GDP
and log city population. The F-test of each column tests the sum of the estimated coe¢cients on
min_wage and min_wage  import.
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Table B4: Considering city pairs located near boarders of di¤erent provinces
all patents invention utility design citations citations2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Unweighted Regressions
min_wage -0.068*** -0.044*** -0.032*** -0.016*** -0.047*** -0.045***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
min_wage  import 0.206*** 0.158*** 0.175*** 0.019 0.151*** 0.144***
(0.034) (0.024) (0.021) (0.017) (0.027) (0.026)
import -1.251*** -0.974*** -1.070*** -0.105 -0.925*** -0.881***
(0.206) (0.146) (0.124) (0.104) (0.165) (0.159)
F-test 
1
+ 
2
> 0 13.963 20.415 37.357 0.030 13.797 13.363
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.863 0.000 0.000
Adj R-Squared 0.494 0.467 0.477 0.361 0.425 0.421
Panel B: Weighted Regressions
min_wage -0.070*** -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.018** -0.047*** -0.045***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
min_wage  import 0.204*** 0.156*** 0.177*** 0.012 0.148*** 0.141***
(0.031) (0.022) (0.020) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023)
import -1.243*** -0.967*** -1.089*** -0.063 -0.906*** -0.864***
(0.187) (0.131) (0.118) (0.089) (0.148) (0.142)
F-test 
1
+ 
2
> 0 15.091 25.398 35.376 0.111 16.164 15.646
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.740 0.000 0.000
Adj R-Squared 0.492 0.463 0.475 0.363 0.424 0.420
Firm-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City pair-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2175642 2175642 2175642 2175642 2175642 2175642
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by two-way clustering at the
city and city-pair-year levels are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic after adding
1. Citations are the number of rms patents cited, and citations2 are the number of rms patents cited which
exclude self cited. Firm-level controls include log rm size, log capital-labor ratio, the proportion of rm exports
in total sales and log rm age. City-level controls include log per capita city GDP and log city population.
The F-test of each column tests the sum of the estimated coe¢cients on min_wage and min_wage  import.
Regressions in Panel A are unweighted, and regressions in Panel B are weighted by the inverse of the number
of duplicates in the city-pair rm-level sample.
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Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 1. Here we derive the steady-state equilibrium condition that
determines ft . Using (7), (10b) and p
f
t (!) = pz=, we obtain
(nft )
1
xft =
ft
2pz
(nft )
1 
 Yt. (C1)
Substituting (C1) and (22b) into (24), we have
ft =

h
ft (n
f
t )
1 

i(" 1)="
(1  )
h
pz(1  
f
t )
i(" 1)="
+ 
h
ft (n
f
t )
1 

i(" 1)=" , (C2)
which can be re-expressed as
ft =
(nft )
(1 )(" 1)

(1  )"(pz)" 1=(2" 1" 1) + (n
f
t )
(1 )(" 1)

 f(nft ) 2 (0; 1). (C3)
It is useful to note that f 0(nft ) > 0 and f
00(nft ) < 0 due to " > 1. From (26), there exist
unique steady-state levels of R&D spending given by Rd = =( + ft ) 2 (0; 1) and R
f =
ft =( + 
f
t ) 2 (0; 1) where 
f
t 2 (0; 1) from (C3). Then, we combine n
f = (1 + f )Rf=
and Rf = ft =( + 
f
t ) into the following expression:
nf
1 + f
= Rf =
f
 + f
,
which can be re-expressed as
nf =
1

f
 
1 + f

 + f
. (C4)
Finally, substituting (C3) into (C4) yields
	()
1
f

f
1  f
 
(1 )(" 1)
=
1 + f
 + f
, (C5)
where
	()  

1  
2 1="
 "
(1 )(" 1)

pz

 
1 
,
which is decreasing in . Note that the left-hand side of (C5) is monotonically increasing in
f if  > ("  1) =" and that the right-hand side is decreasing in f if  < 1=. Therefore,
if  2 (("  1) ="; 1=), then (C5) uniquely determines the steady-state value of f . Given
that 	() is decreasing in , an increase in  leads to a decrease in the left-hand side of
(C5), which in turn yields an increase in f . The increase in f increases the intensity of
imported inputs, decreases non-importing rms innovation and increases importing rms
innovation as shown in (25) and (26).
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CES function in (8a): We now show that our results are robust to generalizing (8a)
to the following CES production function for Xdt :
Xdt =
8<
:(1  )(Ldt ) " 1" + 
"Z ndt
0
[xdt (!)]
d!
# " 1
"
9=
;
"
" 1
. (C6)
Following the same derivations as in the proof of Proposition 1, one can show that (C5)
becomes the following system that determines d and f :
	()
1
f

f
1  f
 
(1 )(" 1)
=
1 + f
d + f
, (C7a)
 ()
1
d

d
1  d
 
(1 )(" 1)
=
1
d + f
, (C7b)
where we have dened the following composite parameters:
	()  

1  
2 1="
 "
(1 )(" 1)

pz

 
1 
,
 ()  

1  
2 1="
 "
(1 )(" 1)

1

 
1 
.
Lemma 1 If " < (1  =2)=(1  ), then the equilibrium is unique.
Proof. We re-express (C7) as
d =

(f )  1

f , (C8a)
f =
"
1
 ()

1  d
d


  1
#
d, (C8b)
where we have dened

 

(1  ) ("  1)
,
(f ) 
1 + f
	()

1  f
f


.
Substituting (C8a) into (C8b) and rearranging some terms yield
 ()
(f )
(f )  1
1=

=
1
[(f )  1] f
  1. (C9)
Multiplying both sides of (C9) by [(f )  1]=(f ), we obtain
(f )  1
(f )
(
 1)=

=
1
[ ()]1=


1 + f
(f )f
  1

. (C10)
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Suppose " < (1   =2)=(1   ), which is equivalent to 
 > 2. Then, as f increases from
0 to 1, both (f ) and (f )f would decrease from innity to 0.23 Therefore, we can
dene two threshold values of f denoted as ff
 
;f+g 2 (0; 1) such that (
f
+) = 1 and
f
 
(f
 
) = 1+f
 
. It is useful to note that f
 
< f+ because (
f
+) < (
f
 
) = 1+1=f
 
.24
Figure 1: Equilibrium uniqueness
As shown in Figure 1, the left-hand side of (C10) decreases from 1 to 0 as f increases from
0 to f+, whereas the right-hand side of (C10) increases from 0 to innity as 
f increases from
f
 
to 1. Given f
 
< f+, (C10) uniquely determines the equilibrium value of 
f 2 (0; 1),
which then determines the equilibrium value of d 2 (0; 1) in (C8a).
Lemma 2 f is increasing in .
Proof. Given that the left-hand side (LHS) of (C10) is increasing in (f ) and that (f )
is also increasing in ,25 an increase in  shifts up the LHS to the right in Figure 1. Then,
the right-hand side (RHS) of (C10) can be divided into two parts as follows:
RHS =
1 + f
f
1
 ()1=
(f )
 
1
 ()1=

.
 ()1=
 is decreasing in  and (f ) is increasing in ; however, it can be shown that
 ()1=
(f ) is increasing in  given
 > 1. Therefore, the rst term in the RHS is decreasing
in . In addition, the second term 1= ()1=
 is also decreasing in . As a result, an increase
in  shifts down the RHS also to the right in Figure 1. Finally, both the shifts in the LHS
and the RHS give rise to an increase in f .
23It can be shown that (f )f is decreasing in f if 
 > maxf2  1=; 1g.
24Recall that (f ) is decreasing in f .
25Note that (f ) is decreasing in 	(), which in turn is decreasing in .
22
Lemma 3 f=d is increasing in  if and only if  > 0.
Proof. Given the unique equilibrium in Lemma 1, we combine (C7a) and (C7b) and then
apply the approximation ln(1 + i)  i to derive
f   d =
1
2
  1

 

1  
ln pz + 
f (
+
)

, (C11)
which shows ln(f=d) = lnf   ln d  f  d is increasing in  if and only if  > 0.
Given I = f and Rf=Rd = f=d, Lemma 2 and 3 imply that all the results in
Proposition 1 are robust to generalizing (8a) to the CES version in (C6).
23
